Guernsey policy Council Releases & Statements

Landsbanki islands HF Creditor reports

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This page will be dedicated to keeping an index of all reports relating to Landsbanki Guernsey

It will take some time to collate, but will be added to as time goes on.As near as possible in date order, latest at the top.

Anyone who would like to suggest a report that has been missed out, contact if possible with the link.

Report Name Date Author Comments
Deloitte update 27th Nov 2012 Deloitte update Deloittes latest report  updats final payment and progress in iceland. Also final payment unlikely before the end of 2013, once icelandic litigation completed.
Comments on Latest deloitte update 18th Sept 2012 This website Deloittes latest report (14th Sept 2012) made some interesting statements as to why landsbanki Guernsey Depositors will receive back less than depositors in other Icelandic Banks. 1) Because of upstreaming of Funds. 2) Because of a lack of Governmental support. 3) Because there was no Depositors Compensation Scheme in place.  This statement appears to lay part of the blame at the door of the GFSC and this Link  takes you to those comments.
Deloittes latest update   14th Sept 2012 deloitte update Latest update
Deloittes latest update. 9th July 2012 deloitte update Latest Update
Deloitte latest update. 16 Jan 2012 Deloitte latest update
DeLoitte Update 31st Oct 2011 DeLoitte Report on Supreme court ruling in Iceland. Landsbanki Guernsey depositors remain ordinary creditors , whilst UK local authorities become priority creditors. This basically means that Landsbanki depositors will probably get nothing.
DeLoitte Update 25th Jan 2011 DeLoitte Report on Commissioner's sitting at the Royal Court Guernsey on the Liquididation of Landsbanki Guernsey
DeLoitte Update 24th Aug 2011 DeLoitte Icelandic situation update and expenses
Deloitte update 15th Dec 2010 DeLoitte Update on the Liquidation of landsbanki Guernsey which took place on the 7th December 2010. 
Deloitte update 20 August 2010 Deloitte A basic statement saying there will be an update in september and may be a payout later in the year if the Royal Court approve.

Heritable's 5th report


10th Aug 2010 Ernst & Young Ernst & Young latest update on Heritable in administration
Guernsey Depositors Compensation Scheme Board, 2009 Annual report 19th July 2010 DCS Board The First annual report issued by the DCS Board. It shows just how much is still lacking in transparency and detail given to depositors. Q. Is the fund fully funded, if not, how full is the fund? The most important question to depositors, How much will I get back? Up to £50,000 is not an answer, it could mean anything from £0 to £50,000.

Principle 12 . Public awareness

In order for a deposit insurance system to be effective it is essential that the public be informed on an ongoing basis about the benefits and limitations of the deposit insurance system.

DCS BOARD Assessment: This topic is considered at some length in the report. The website,

leaflet and advertising code together are designed to ensure that members of the public are fully and accurately informed.

GFSC annual report for 2009 July 2010 GFSC

Debated by the States of Guernsey wed 28th July 2010

A Landsbanki depositor's comments on the Landsbanki aspects.

The LGDAG dispute arears of the report under the Banking Divison section and would like to put on record that they do not accept them.

Landsbanki Guernsey in administration, Deloittes updates. June 2010 Deloitte

Latest updates from deloitte for Landsbanki Guernsey Creditors

Iceland Special Investigation Commission report delivered to Althingi. ( The Truth report) April 12th 2010

Iceland Special investigation


Summaries delivered in English.

Summary of the reports main conclusions.

Chapter 17. Depositors and investors guarantee fund, Depositors Guarantees in general.

Chapter 18. Deposits in Financial institutions in branches abroad.

Chapter 21. Causes of the collapse of the icelandic banks - Responsibility, Mistakes, and negligence

Relationship between the Ministry of justice and the Crown dependencies 23 March 2010 UK justice Committee

A report showing the complete breakdown of representation by the UK Justice department & treasury during the icelandic crisis.

Concerns of the Crown dependencies starts at section 83

A Ministry of Justice conclusion

The representation of the interests of the Crown Dependencies on the international stage by the UK Government is not optional, according to whether or not the interests of the Islands are congruent with those of the UK: it is the UK Government’s duty. In cases of conflict, the Ministry of Justice must endeavour to find a mechanism for representation which will faithfully present and serve the interests of both parties.

Heritable bank Plc in administration 28th January 2010 Ernst & Young

Heritable Bank updates by Ernst & Young.

10th August 2010, Heritable's 5th report

Isle Of Man, Tynwald, Select Committee on Kaupthing ,Singer & Friedlander, and depositors Compensation Scheme. 25th January 2010 Tynwold, Isle of Man select Committee

Allan Bell M.H.K Treasury Minister Gives evidence. 25th January 2010 . Includes "collateral damage" para's 910-995......

The Hunt Review 5th Nov 2009 Lord Hunt

A Strategic review of Guernsey's banking industry

Lord Hunt statement in the report:

The proportion of deposits made by Guernsey residents is comparatively small. The Guernsey public have a right to reasonably expect at least the same protection as depositors in other (OECD) jurisdictions. The issue is exacerbated in smaller jurisdictions like Guernsey because they do not have a central bank capable of acting as lender of last resort and their tax base generally restricts the ability to inject liquidity or capital into a troubled bank.

Landsbanki Depositors Action Group report to Policy Council



7 October 2009 Matthew Dorman

A 17 page report is sent to the Policy Council laying out all the evidence to show that a full independent select Committee type inquiry is needed into the landsbanki Guernsey affair.

Extract from the introduction:

Landsbanki Guernsey Limited (LGL) collapsed primarily because it was prevented from accessing funds in its sister bank, Heritable UK (HB), following UK Government intervention by means of FSA and UK Treasury management of Heritable transfers in the days prior to Heritable Bank being placed under administration.  Heritable was unable to access an established line of credit from its parent Landsbanki Islands HF (LIhf). Deprived of liquidity, LGL’s senior management were forced to apply to the Royal Court of Guernsey to place the bank into administration.

The Foot Report October 2009 Michael Foot

Final report of the independent review of British offshore Financial centres

Comments in the report:

"Those jurisdictions that offer (or propose to offer) protection to retail depositors must ensure that compensation schemes can be understood by those depositors."


"It is, however, important that there is effective co-operation between the FSA and the regulators in the nine jurisdictions when this is required to deliver effective regulation."


GFSC Additional notes on upstreaming and transparency January 2010 Guernsey Financial Services Commission (GFSC) This report is issued as a later addition to the August 2008 document , a Consultation on Parental upstreaming and the introduction of a Depositor Protection scheme. 

"3.2 Licence holders should therefore state the following in literature and advertising (including websites) that invites the taking of deposits:"

"[name of licence holder] places funds with (the parent) and thus its financial standing is linked to (the parent). Depositors may wish to form their own view on the financial standing of [name of the parent] based on publicly available information, including reports and accounts, obtainable from (insert details)".

Guernsey Chief Minister Latest update 10th Aug 2009 Policy Council States of Guernsey have been a waste of space right from the start in providing assistance for depositors. The Chief Minister in particular has pursued a policy of "benign neglect", whilst attempting to pass it off as " working tirelessly behind the scenes".

Treasury Committee:

The impact of the failure of the Icelandic Banks

4th April 2009 Treasury Select Committee, First report

A general explaination of the way it happened and the UK action.

Conclusion extract: 

"As such, while we acknowledge the severe distress of those

UK citizens suffering due to the Icelandic banking failure, we can only recommend that the

UK authorities work with the Isle of Man and Guernsey authorities to resolve these issues."

Treasury Select committee:

Banking Crisis of 2008 all reports

2008/2009 Treasury select Committee This link covers a number of select committee report on the 2008 banking crisis, not necessarily directly connected to Landsbanki.
Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis, Written Evidence 17th March 2009 Treasury Committee

Memorandum from states of Guernsey. P 152

Memorandum from Landsbanki Guernsey Depositors Action Group P 143

Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis, Vol 1, Oral Evidence 3rd Feb 2009 Treasury Committee

Neil Dickens LGDAG Page Ev 177

Lyndon Trott ( Guernsey Chief Minister) page Ev 187

Peter Neville Director General GFSC page Ev187

The letters between GFSC & FSA Commenced 6/01/2009 Peter Neville/FSA The Correspondence asked for by the Treasury Select Committee and submitted in evidence. These letters clearly show that the GFSC were placing all their reliance on the UK FSA, who were being ambigious to say the least, and the GFSC were failing to carry out their own indepth due dilligence. Of course this will only be proved one way or another by a totally independent Select Committee type inquiry. Being resisted by Guernsey's Chief Minister at present. 
The Promontory Report 6th January 2009 Michael Foot Commissioned by the GFSC, under its terms of reference, paid for by them, with no outside input, a shallow self serving report.

Justice Committee, Crown dependencies, Evidence taken

First report

16th December 2008 Ministry of Justice

Wednesday 10th december 2008 Lord Bach  Page Ev 1

Memorandum submitted by Kaupthing, Singer & Friedlander page Ev 6

Memorandum submitted by Landsbanki Guernsey Depositors Action Group pgEv7

 Deloitte press statements and updates.

8th & 11th October 2008

20th Jan 2009


Press statements released by Deloitte:“The Bank had taken measures to diversify its exposure to its parent company in the six months preceding my appointment. The main reason for the Bank’s difficulties has been the placing of funds with its UK fellow subsidiary, Heritable Bank, which has now gone into Administration."


GFSC Consultation on Parental upstreaming and the introduction of a Depositor protection scheme

August 2008 Guernsey Financial Services Commission (GFSC)

Consultation on parental upstreaming and the introduction of

depositor protection and ombudsman schemes. One has to give the GFSC some credit in their persistance in attempting to get a DPS introduced into Guernsey, but States of Guernsey apathy overcame them.

The Landsbanki Islands hf

Guarantee given to the Cheshire

and depositors on the purchase

of Cheshire Guernsey

August 2006


Islands hf


This guarantee was never signed by Landsbanki Islands hf and it makes you wonder at the amount of due diligence that went on by the GFSC prior to allowing Landsbanki islands hf purchase Cheshire Guernsey ltd.

GFSC consultation document on a DCS & Ombudsman

January 2002

Guernsey Financial Services


A Consultation document on a Depositors Compensation scheme, and a financial

Ombudsman. This came to nothing, the Banks were apparently not interested and

Guernsey's Government not prepared to push it.

The Edwards Report

November 1998

UK Government

Review of the

Crown Dependencies

It was this report that first recommended that Guernsey should have a Depositors

Compensation Scheme and a Financial Ombudsman.

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